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Insurance
by Ralph F. Simpson'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The volume of cases that reached the appellate courts of Georgia
during this survey period was greater than last year. The courts decided
slightly over fifty cases this year that dealt with insurance issues. Most
of these cases originated from the trial courts on declaratory judgment
actions. Indeed, over twenty of the cases reviewed in this Article are
declaratory judgment actions. The current trend seems to be for the
insurer to file a declaratory judgment action to determine coverage
issues while attempting to stay the case on the merits that gave rise to
those issues. The reason for this is perfectly understandable.
Two cases decided during the survey period illustrate the danger of an
insurer not seeking a declaration of its obligations under the terms of
the policy. The first of these, Adams v. Atlanta Casualty Co.1 related

to a driver exclusion endorsement. The Adams' son was the excluded
driver under the policy issued to his parents. He had an automobile
collision, and after suit was filed arising from the collision, the Adamses
claimed coverage under the Atlanta Casualty policy. Thereafter, Atlanta
Casualty, by letter, informed the Adamses that an investigation showed
their son was operating the vehicle, and because he was an excluded
driver under the policy, "there [was] no coverage afforded by [the] policy
for this loss."' Atlanta Casualty then fied a petition for declaratory
judgment, but the underlying action was not stayed and resulted in a
verdict in favor of plaintiff. Almost a year after the judgment was
entered, Atlanta Casualty moved for summary judgment in the
declaratory judgment action. In the motion, Atlanta Casualty contended
that no coverage and no duty to defend existed because of the named
* Partner in the firm of Simpson, Gray & Cross, Tifton, Georgia. Emory University
(B.A., 1966); Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 1969). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 225 Ga. App. 482, 484 S.E.2d 302 (1997).
2. Id. at 483, 484 S.E.2d at 303.
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driver exclusion. The trial court granted the motion for summary
judgment without explanation 8
The question before the court of appeals was whether this case was
appropriate for a declaratory judgment.' The Adamses contended that
Atlanta Casualty had waived its right to seek a declaratory judgment
because it had earlier denied coverage. The Georgia Court of Appeals
agreed.' "When a declaratory judgment cannot guide and protect the
petitioner regarding a future act, no declaratory judgment is authorized.' The court considered four factors in determining whether a
declaratory judgment was appropriate: "(1) a demand for payment had
been made; (2) the company had not yet acted to deny the claim; (3)
legitimate questions existed about the validity and applicability of the
policy clause; and (4) Georgia law did not provide a clear answer."' In
this case, because Atlanta Casualty had denied the claim and removed
any doubt regarding its duties under the contract of insurance, it was
not met with uncertainty on future acts, and declaratory judgment
therefore would not lie in the case."
The second case, Jefferson Insurance Co. v. Dunn,' underscores the
need for an insurance company to use the declaratory judgment action
procedure. In this case, plaintiff, Dunn, sustained permanent brain
damage after he was beaten by a manager of the Jolly Fox Lounge that
was insured by Jefferson. Jefferson had issued a policy covering Jolly
Fox in the amount of $50,000. When the suit was originally filed,
plaintiff offered to settle before the trial for the $50,000 limit. Jolly Fox
directed the insurance company to settle for the policy limits, but
Jefferson refused and also refused to defend the suit relying upon an
assault and/or battery exclusion endorsement. Jefferson did not issue a
reservation of rights letter and never sought a judicial declaration of its
rights and duties under the policy. A judgment was rendered in favor
of plaintiff
for $250,000 compensatory damages and $750,000 punitive
10
damages.
After this judgment was entered, Jefferson retained counsel to appeal
and entered into a settlement agreement with Jolly Fox. In the
agreement, Jolly Fox released all its claims under the Jefferson policy

3. Id. at 483-84, 484 S.E.2d at 304.
4. Id. at 484, 484 S.E.2d at 304.

5. Id.
6. Id. (citing Mayor of Athens v. Gerdine, 202 Ga. 197, 42 S.E.2d 567 (1947)).
7. Id. at 485, 484 S.E.2d at 305. These factors were set out in Atlanta Casualty Co.
v. Fountain, 262 Ga. 16, 413 S.E.2d 450 (1992).

8. 225 Ga. App. at 485, 484 S.E.2d at 305.
9. 224 Ga. App. 732, 482 S.E.2d 383 (1997).
10. Id. at 732-33, 482 S.E.2d at 385-86.
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in payment of $5,500. Dunn brought suit and alleged that Jefferson
obtained the release with the intention to delay or defraud plaintiff from
satisfaction of the $1,000,000 judgment. The result of this second suit
was a judgment in favor of Dunn for $1,500,000 compensatory damages
and $3,000,000 punitive damages."
On appeal, Jefferson attempted to argue the coverage issue. In
response, the court of appeals held that "Jefferson is estopped to argue
no coverage by its failure to enter a pretrial reservation of rights and
pursuing a declaratory judgment action promptly after discovering facts
indicating the absence of coverage."' The court relied upon the rule of
Richmond v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.'" that
requires the insurer first give the insured proper unilateral notice of its
reservation of rights and then take steps to prevent the main case from
going into default or to prevent the insured from being prejudiced and
seek immediate declaratory judgment relief including a stay of the main
case. 4 The court affirmed the judgment in the second case and held
that under the facts of the case Jefferson "'failed to establish a
reasonable ground for contesting the claim and thus, had acted in bad
faith in refusing to make payment [and in refusing to defend its
insured].'""5 Thus, when there is any question regarding coverage, the
most prudent course of action for an insurer to follow is the procedures
outlined in Dunn.
II.

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE

Policy Construction
A number of the automobile cases considered by the Georgia Court of
Appeals this year dealt with exclusionary provisions of the policy. In

A.

11. Id. at 733-34, 482 S.E.2d at 386-87.

12. Id. at 737, 482 S.E.2d at 388.
13. 140 Ga. App. 215, 231 S.E.2d 245 (1976).
14. 224 Ga. App. at 737, 482 S.E.2d at 388.
15. Id. at 740-41,482 S.E.2d at 391 (quoting Canal Ins. Co. v. Savannah Bank, 181 Ga.
App. 520, 524, 352 S.E.2d 835, 839 (1987) (alteration in original)).
"Upon learning of facts reasonably putting it on notice that there may be grounds
for non coverage and where the insured refuses to consent to a defense under a
reservation of rights, the insurer must thereupon (a) give the insured proper
unilateral notice of its reservation of rights, (b) take necessary steps to prevent the
main case from going into default or to prevent the insured from being otherwise
prejudiced, and (c) seek immediate declaratory relief including a stay of the main
case pending final resolution of the declaratory judgment action."
Id. at 737, 482 S.E.2d at 388-89 (quoting Richmond, 140 Ga. App. at 219, 231 S.E.2d at 248
(emphasis omitted)).
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Middlebrooks v. Atlanta Casualty Co., 6 the court of appeals reaffirmed
the rule that any named driver exclusion is enforceable if the exclusion
agreement is supported by consideration between the parties." The
case is instructive on how to prove the consideration. In Middlebrooks,
the agent who sold the policy testified that the agreement to issue the
policy was conditioned on the insured's consent to the named driver
This was sufficient evidence of consideration to satisfy the
exclusion.
8
court.'

In a somewhat contradictory opinion, the court of appeals determined
that an FBI agent was not insured under his policy while driving a "nonowned car" furnished to him by the FBI for business use.' 9 Under the
policy issued to the driver, a "non-owned car was any car, other than an
'insured car,' and 'which [was] not owned by or furnished or available for
regular or frequent use.'"20 The court determined there was no
coverage provided for the driver's use of a non-owned car without
permission and "the uncontroverted evidence [was] that [the driver] did
not have permission to use the employer-owned car for any personal
errand, thus, there was no coverage afforded [him] during any personal
n"
However, the court also stated that
use of the employer-owned car.
the record did not disclose whether the driver was driving the employerowned vehicle for business or personal use at the time of the underlying
Thus the opinion is contradictory unless the court of
incident.'
appeals is trying to say that this opinion does not preclude coverage if
it is shown that the incident occurred while the driver was using the
vehicle for a permitted purpose.
Another permissive use case, Hardingv. Georgia General Insurance
Co.,' afforded an opportunity for the court of appeals to apply the
Georgia Supreme Court decision in Hurst v. Grange Mutual Casualty
Harding construed the "reasonable belief' permissive use
Co."
exclusion. 25 The dispute in the case sub judice arose from an incident
in which the insured's son was alleged to have intentionally struck
16.

222 Ga. App. 785, 476 S.E.2d 82 (1996).

17. Id. at 786, 476 S.E.2d at 82 (citing Miley v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 176 Ga. App.
527, 336 S.E.2d 583 (1985)).
18. Id., 476 S.E.2d at 83.
19. Watson v. Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co., 222 Ga. App. 857, 858, 476 S.E.2d
620, 621 (1996).
20. Id. at 857, 476 S.E.2d at 621.
21. Id. at 858, 476 S.E.2d at 621.
22. Id. at 857-58, 476 S.E.2d at 621.
23. 224 Ga. App. 22, 479 S.E.2d 410 (1996).
24. 266 Ga. 712, 470 S.E.2d 659 (1996). This case was discussed in last year's survey
of Georgia law. See Ralph F. Simpson, Insurance, 48 MERCER L. REV. 361, 366 (1996).
25. 224 Ga. App. at 23, 479 S.E.2d at 411.
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another person with a car following a verbal altercation. The son,
Patrick, made several contradictory statements concerning whether he
knew at the time of the incident he did not have permission to use the
vehicle.2" In determining that a jury question was presented, the court
explained that to prevail on a motion for summary judgment under this
exclusion, an insurer must prove either that the driver actually believed
that he did not have permission, or that he had no reasonable basis for
his belief if he mistakenly believed that he had permission.' Because
the sole evidence of Patrick's actual state of mind was determined by the
court to be his sworn statement and there was impeaching evidence
regarding that statement, a material issue was created that only the
jury could decide.'
Therefore, the court denied summary judgment to
9
the insurer.2
In Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Burch," the
"family exclusion" that is generally found in auto policies was attacked.
Farm Bureau had issued a $25,000 liability policy to Ms. Robertson's
mother. Ms. Robertson lived with her mother and was listed on the
declarations sheet as an additional driver. She allowed plaintiff Burch
to drive the car and was riding with him when he had an accident that
caused her injuries. The specific exclusion limited coverage for bodily
injury to the named insured or any family member to the extent the
limits of liability of the coverage exceeded the limits of liability required
by law."1 At the time of the accident, Georgia law required liability
limits of $15,000 for bodily injury to one person in one automobile
accident.3 2 The court of appeals simply held that the exclusion did not
violate public policy.3 3 The court further opined that even if the
exclusion was found to be contrary to public policy, it would still be
"enforceable
as to amounts in excess of the statutory minimum cover4
age."3

An interesting fact situation gave the Georgia Court of Appeals an
opportunity to allow a jury to determine whether a truck and trailer
were "borrowed" at the time of an incident that gave rise to a wrongful

26.
27.
28.

Id. at 22, 479 S.E.2d at 411.
Id. at 23, 479 S.E.2d at 411.
Id. at 26, 479 S.E.2d at 414.

29. Id.
30. 222 Ga. App. 749, 476 S.E.2d 62 (1996).
31. Id at 749-50, 476 S.E.2d at 63.
32. Id. at 750, 476 S.E.2d at 63 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 33-34-4 (1996 & Supp. 1997) and
40-9-2 (1997)).
33. Id.
34. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Stepho v. Allstate Ins. Co., 259 Ga. 475,383 S.E.2d 887
(1989)).

180

MERCER LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 49

death action." A commercial lines policy issued to Franklin defined
"insured" as one "who is using, with the 'permission' of said named
insureds, 'a covered auto' which the named insureds 'own, hire or
borrow."' The trailer was owned by Pounds, and the truck was leased
to him. He had sent the truck to Franklin's business premises so
Franklin could display the trailer in an effort to sell it. Franklin then
contacted Wilson, who had sold some trailers for Franklin on a
commission earlier, and asked him to find a place in Alpharetta to show
the trailer. Franklin turned the trailer over to Wilson after Pounds
agreed, and Wilson was hauling the truck and trailer to Alpharetta at
the time of the collision that resulted in a wrongful death action against
Wilson. State Farm insured Pounds, and American Hardware Mutual
insured Franklin. Wilson was insured by Hartford under a personal
policy issued to him and his wife. The coverage question arose under the
policy issued to Franklin by American Hardware. The precise question
was whether the truck was "borrowed" so as to be an insured vehicle
under the Franklin policy.87 After considering dictionary definitions of
the word "borrow," the court found it was properly within the province
of the jury to determine whether the truck came within the above's
definition.'8
A similar question was presented in Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Hendrix.39 The underlying dispute that gave rise to this declaratory
judgment action arose from a car accident in which Hendrix, riding a
motorcycle, ran into a car driven by Cummins. The car was owned by
Buis, who gave Cummins permission to drive. Allstate had issued an
auto policy to Buis as well as a personal umbrella policy with limits of
$1,000,000. Both Allstate and Cummins's company tendered the policy
Hendrix claimed that
limits on their underlying auto policies.'
Cummins was an insured under the Buis' umbrella that defined an
insured as "you" and "any person related to you by blood, marriage or
adoption who resides in your household."' The policy also applied to
occurrences arising out of "the lending by an insured of a land vehicle or
watercraft owned by an insured.""2 The Allstate policy stated that
"Allstate will pay when an insured becomes legally obligated to pay for

35. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 224 Ga. App. 789,
482 S.E.2d 714 (1997).
36. Id. at 792, 482 S.E.2d at 717.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 793, 482 S.E.2d at 717.
39. 222 Ga. App. 865, 476 S.E.2d 644 (1996).
40. Id. at 865, 476 S.E.2d at 645.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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personal injury or property damage caused by an occurrence."43
However, there were no allegations that Buis was in any way legally
obligated for Hendrix's injuries, and Cummins did not fit the definition
of an insured under the policy. Therefore, Allstate was not required to
provide coverage for this accident under the personal umbrella policy."
This case illustrates the difference in the policy language between the
personal umbrella policy and the generally used auto form that extends
coverage to a permissive user.4
State Farm's medical payment reimbursement provision was the
subject of Sheppard v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co." Sheppard
argued that two phrases in the provision rendered it invalid as a
The court of appeals did not agree, finding
prohibited assignment.'
that the language requiring that the insured "not make claim to that
portion of the recovery that [State Farm was] entitled to be paid," did
not create an assignment by prohibiting the insured from making the
claim against a tortfeasor." The court of appeals regarded Sheppard's
argument as a strained construction that distorted the "obvious meaning
of the language. 49 Likewise, the court did not believe the provision
that required the insured to furnish State Farm with information needed
"to seek a recovery" allowed it to bring a lawsuit against the tortfeasor.
The court found the provision was "not materially different from that
found in Shook v. Pilot Life Insurance Co."50
Many lawyers think that if one of the defendants is a motor contract
carrier and it has been issued a certificate of public convenience and
necessity by the Public Service Commission, ("PSC"), then coverage is
provided on that defendant's vehicles for the policy limit of the policy
filed with the PSC. This is not necessarily so, according to the court of
appeals in Kinard v. National Indemnity Co."' Kinard purchased a
policy from National Indemnity Company that provided liability coverage

43. Id.
44.

Id. at 866, 476 S.E.2d at 645-46.

45. Id.
46.
47.
48.

222 Ga. App. 619, 475 S.E.2d 675 (1996).
Id. at 619, 475 S.E.2d at 675.
Id. at 620, 475 S.E.2d at 676.

49. Id.
50. Id. (citing 188 Ga. App. 714, 373 S.E.2d 813 (1988)). The court cited cases in which
it found that the disputed provision did create an invalid assignment: Southern Gen. Ins.

Co. v. Ezekiel, 213 Ga. App. 665, 445 S.E.2d 807 (1994); Government Employees Ins. Co.
v. Hirsh, 211 Ga. App. 374, 439 S.E.2d 59 (1993); Wrightsman v. Hardware Dealers Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 306, 147 S.E.2d 860 (1966). 222 Ga. App. at 619-20, 475 S.E.2d
at 675.
51. 225 Ga. App. 176, 483 S.E.2d 664 (1997).
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of $750,000 resulting from the "ownership, maintenance, or use of a
covered 'auto."' 2 The policy expressly defined which of Kinard's autos
were covered by reference to a numeric symbol next to each of the
specific types of coverages listed on the declarations page. On the
declarations page, the symbol next to "Liability" was a "7." This meant,
under the terms of the declarations page, that coverage extended "only
to those 'autos' described in item 3 of the Declarations for which a
premium charge is shown.""8 The vehicle in the accident giving rise to
this dispute was not listed under item 3. Although there was some
evidence that the truck served as the replacement for a vehicle listed in
the declarations page, Kinard did not notify the company that it wanted
liability coverage for the truck within thirty days of its acquisition.
Therefore, Kinard was not covered under the express terms of the policy.
Plaintiffs argued that the PSC rules, which require a certificate of
insurance prior to issuance of a certificate of public convenience and
necessity, obligated National to extend coverage to this vehicle." The
court found that an endorsement to the certificate of insurance that had
been filed with the PSC required the motor carrier to "provide insurance
for automobile, bodily injury and property damage liability in accordance
with [state motor carrier] law and regulations to the extent of the
coverage and limits of liability required thereby." The court construed
this language to mean the minimum indemnity insurance benefits
required by law.5 It granted partial summary judgment in favor of
allowing National to limit the liability coverage to $100,000 per
person.5"
The court of appeals decided Southern Fire & Casualty Co. v.
8 in a manner that was reminiscent of the days of "no fault."
Freeman"
Freeman asked the court to determine whether the application for no
fault coverage met the mandates of former Official Code of Georgia
("O.C.G.A.") section 33-34-5(b). 9 The issue was whether "boldface" is
really "boldface" in certain situations. The statute required a boldface
statement that optional coverage required by the statute had been
explained to the applicant.'
In the Southern Fire application, the
statement was in boldface, but the additional language surrounding the

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 177, 483 S.E.2d at 666.
Id.
Id. at 176-78, 483 S.E.2d at 665-66.
Id. at 180, 483 S.E.2d at 668.
Id.
Id. at 181, 483 S.E.2d at 668.
222 Ga. App. 308, 474 S.E.2d 195 (1996).
Id. at 308, 474 S.E.2d at 196 (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-34-5(b) (1996)).
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-34-5(b)).
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statement was also in boldface. The additional language was not
required by law to be in boldface type. Applying the rule previously
applied in these cases,"' the court determined the required statement
was not "different enough to be conspicuous" and, therefore, the
application was not in accord with the statute.6 2 The court further held
that Southern Fire's failure to pay the claim was not in bad faith
because the court was "unaware of any case directly interpreting the
insurance application at issue."6
Uninsured Motorists
In Hinton v. Interstate Guaranty Insurance Co.," the Georgia
Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals, which was
criticized in last year's survey." The court of appeals opined that a
farm tractor being used to pull a mobile home on a county road was not
a "motor vehicle" for the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage.6 The
supreme court recognized the remedial purpose of the uninsured
motorist statute 7 and held that the term "motor vehicle" should be
construed broadly.6' The court stated the term must include
B.

at least [two] classes of motor vehicles: (1) motor vehicles that are
designed primarily for use on the public roads and are required by law
to be covered by liability insurance; and (2) motor vehicles that are not
designed primarily for use on the public roads and are not required to
have liability insurance, but which at the time of an accident are being
operated on the public roads like a vehicle designed primarily for that
purpose. 9
Therefore, the tractor in this case was a motor vehicle for the purpose
of the uninsured motorist statute.7 0
The court of appeals considered three cases within the survey period
that dealt with problems associated with the decision of the supreme
court in Bohannon v. J.C. Penney Casualty Insurance Co. 71 In Bohan-

61. See Southern Guar. Ins. v. Goddard, 259 Ga. 257, 379 S.E.2d 778 (1989).
62. 222 Ga. App. at 308, 474 S.E.2d at 196.
63. Id. at 310, 474 S.E.2d at 197.
64. 267 Ga. 516, 48 S.E.2d 842 (1997).
65. Ralph F. Simpson, Insurance, 48 MERCER L. REv. 361, 373 (1996).
66. 267 Ga. at 516, 480 S.E.2d at 843 (citing Hinton v. Interstate Guar. Co., 220 Ga.
App. 699, 470 S.E.2d 292 (1996)).
67. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (1992 & Supp. 1997).
68. 267 Ga. at 519, 480 S.E.2d at 844.
69. I& at 518, 480 S.E.2d at 844.
70. Id. at 520, 480 S.E.2d at 845.
71. 259 Ga. 162, 377 S.E.2d 853 (1989).
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non the supreme court held that an "uninsured motorist carrier must be
served within the time allowed for valid service on the defendant in the
tort action."72 It is not hard to imagine the injustices that can result
from the strict application of this rule. The court of appeals struggled
in each of the following cases to avoid a harsh result.
The first of these cases is Reid v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co.78 Plaintiff in this case filed suit against defendant in 1991. When
the suit was filed, defendant was insured by State Casualty Insurance
Company. Plaintiff did not serve the uninsured motorist carrier, United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Company ("U.S.F.& G."), at that time.
However, during the pendency of the lawsuit and more than two years
after the date of the collision, State Casualty was declared insolvent.
Reid's counsel then served U.S.F.& G. Before U.S.F.& G.'s answer was
due, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the suit and refied the present case
within the six month period allowed by Georgia's renewal statute.7 '
U.S.F.& G. contended the suit against it was void because the two year
statute of limitations had expired before it was served, and therefore, the
renewal action could not be pursued.' The court did not agree. Liberally
construing the renewal sthtute, the court held that the suit against
U.S.F.& G. was merely voidable and not void because the trial court had
not ruled on the asserted affirmative defense of statute of limitations.7 5
After a lengthy discussion of the potential exceptions to the rule of
Bohannon created by the statutes dealing with the renewal statute,7 6
the court registered the following plea: "Fact situations such as this cry
out for legislative action, and, should such pleas produce no result,
rethinking by the Supreme Court of the policy reflected in the cases
regarding the applicability of the two-year statute of limitations."77
Another panel of the court of appeals recognized "the injustice of the
effect of the Bohannon rule," but nevertheless applied the rule in Stozt
v. Cincinnati Insurance Co."8 Stout filed suit against Wolf, who was
driving a truck when an automobile collision occurred and Stout was
injured. The suit was filed in 1994, but Cincinnati, Stout's uninsured
motorist carrier, was not served with a copy of the summons and

72. Id. at 163, 377 S.E.2d at 853 (emphasis added) (citing Vaughn v. Co~lum, 236 Ga.
582, 224 S.E.2d 416 (1976)).
73. 223 Ga. App. 204, 477 S.E.2d 369 (1996).
74. Id. at 204-05, 477 S.E.2d at 370 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61 (1982 & Supp. 1997)).
75. Id. at 205, 477 S.E.2d at 370 (citing Georgia Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Kilgore, 265
Ga. 836, 462 S.E.2d 713 (1995); Hobbs v. Arthur,'264 Ga. 359, 444 S.E.2d 322 (1994)).
76. 1& at 205-06, 477 S.E.2d at 370-71 (citing Bohannon, 259 Ga. 162, 377 S.E.2d at
853; O.C.GJ.L § 9-2-61)).
77. Id. at 207, 477 S.E.2d at 371.
78. 226 Ga. App. 220, 221, 486 S.E.2d 195, 196 (1997).
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complaint in that case. The insurer for Wolf became insolvent in
September 1995, after the statute of limitations had run. Stout
voluntarily dismissed her suit without ever attempting to serve
Cincinnati with a copy of the complaint. Three days after dismissal,
Stout filed a renewal action and had Cincinnati served as an uninsured
motorist. Cincinnati ified an answer in its own name and asserted the
defense of the statute of limitations. The trial court granted Cincinnati's
motion for dismissal.7
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal and held that because
Cincinnati had not been served in the original action and had never been
served within the statute of limitations period, the renewal statute
"[could] not be used to add Cincinnati to the case, approximately one and
one-half years after the statute of limitation [had] expired.' ° Further,
the court distinguished the case from Reid by saying that Reid was
"merely voidable at the time of its dismissal.""' The concurring opinion
of Judge Johnson also asked that the supreme court "fashion" a rule
allowing service upon the insurer within a reasonable time after it is
determined that the defendant is uninsured.82 He placed this burden
upon the supreme court because, in his view, the supreme court created
the problem."
It appears that a reasonable solution would be to allow service upon
the uninsured motorist carrier within two years of the time the
defendant becomes uninsured. In the usual and ordinary case, this
would be two years from the date of the collision, but in those extraordinary circumstances in which the insurer becomes insolvent later, the
statute would begin to run upon the finding of insolvency or lack of
insurance coverage. The supreme court has been requested to grant
certiorari in this case and hopefully it will be granted so the dilemma
created by Bohannon will be resolved and so Stout will not have to suffer
the injustice recognized by the court of appeals. As Jerry Clower might
ask the supreme court: "Shoot up amongst us, one of us needs some
relief."
A similar dilemma was presented to the court in G & MSS Trucking,
Inc. v. Rich." This suit arose from an automobile collision which
occurred in 1993. At that time, plaintiff Rich had $15,000 in uninsured

79. Id. at 220, 486 S.E.2d at 195.
80. Id. at 222, 486 S.E.2d at 196-97 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61).
81. Id., 486 S.E.2d at 197 (citing Reid, 223 Ga. App. 204, 477 S.E.2d 369). See
Bohannon v. J.C. Penney Ins. Co., 259 Ga. 162, 377 S.E.2d 853 (1989).
82. 226 Ga. App. at 222-23, 486 S.E.2d at 197-98 (Johnson, J., concurring).
83. Id
84. 224 Ga. App. 130, 479 S.E.2d 761 (1996).
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motorist coverage for personal injury; $10,000 in uninsured motorist
coverage for property damage; and $25,000 in medical payments
coverage with Southern Trust. Rich filed the underlying suit in 1994,
about one year after the collision. Commonwealth, G & MSS's liability
carrier, was adjudicated insolvent in 1995, more than two and one-half
years after the collision. Plaintiff had not served the uninsured motorist
carrier within the two year personal injury statute of limitations for
service upon defendant. Therefore, at no time during the personal injury
limitation period did a valid uninsured motorist claim exist. The precise
issue in this case was whether the Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool was
entitled to a reduction on Rich's personal injury and property damage
judgment for $8,852." The pertinent statute provides that the injured
party's rights to Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool funds "shall be
reduced by any amounts received from the solvent insurers."' Therefore, the question became whether the judgment should be reduced
because plaintiff failed to pursue the personal injury claim. The court
reasoned that "it would be unreasonable to find that plaintiff should be
charged with having a right to recover uninsured motorist benefits for
personal injury where the statute of limitation barred his claim before
it had ripened." Accordingly, plaintiff's claim was not reduced by the
amount of the verdict for the personal injury portion of the claim. On
the other hand, plaintiff was required to write off the amount of the
verdict for his property damage claims because those carry a four year
statute, and he did not pursue those claims against the uninsured
motorist carrier. Likewise, the verdict was further reduced by the
amount of the medical payments benefits that he had actually received."
Stacking was the subject of only two cases decided during the survey
period. Canal Insurance Co. v. Merchant 9 resolved a dispute between
two uninsured motorist carriers regarding which provided the "primary"
coverage. Canal insured a tractor-trailer that broke down while hauling
chicken feed to Claxton Poultry Company. Claxton sent two company
vehicles, both insured by Northbrook, and four individuals (appellees)
who were employees of Claxton to transfer the chicken feed from the
disabled vehicle. While this was being done, a "minimally insured and
intoxicated driver" drove into the transfer site injuring the appellees,

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 130, 479 S.E.2d at 762.
Id. at 132, 479 S.E.2d at 764 (quoting O.C.GA § 33-36-14 (1996)).
Id., 479 S.E.2d at 763.
Id. at 132-33, 479 S.E.2d at 763-64.
225 Ga. App. 61, 483 S.E.2d 311 (1997).
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including Merchant.' There are two tests that have been used by the
Georgia courts to determine which of the two uninsured motorist carriers
is the primary insurer."1 Neither Merchant nor any of the other
appellees paid any premium for either policy. Therefore, the "receipt of
premium" test was found to be inapplicable.92 Accordingly, the second
test, the "more closely identified with" test, was applied." The focus
of this test is the relationship of the injured party to the policy and not
the relationship between the circumstances of the collision and a
particular policy. The court determined that because there was no
relationship between the appellees and the Canal policy, and because the
Northbrook policy was issued to the appellees' employer, Claxton, the
appellees had a connection with that policy." Therefore, Northbrook
was determined to be the primary uninsured motorist carrier.95
The other case, National General Insurance Co. v. United Services
Automobile Ass'n," involved two uninsured motorist carriers, one of
whom was from out of state. The National General policy was issued in
Michigan to a Michigan resident who was riding in a car owned and
driven by a Georgia resident. The Michigan resident was injured in a
collision that occurred in Georgia. The Georgia resident who owned the
car had a policy issued by United States Automobile Association that
was issued and delivered in Georgia.97 The court held that if construction of the National General contract was the issue in the case, Michigan
law would govern because Georgia follows the doctrine of lex loci
contractus.98 However, the court determined the dispute was not over
the policy language because both carriers admitted coverage. The
dispute was over which was the primary carrier, and therefore, the court
determined Georgia law was applicable and clear." The court followed
the "receipt of premium test" and found that because National General

90. Id. at 62, 483 S.E.2d at 312.
91. Id. (citing Travelers Indem. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 190 Ga. App. 455,379 S.E.2d
183 (1989); Southern Guar. Ins. Co. v. Premier Ins. Co., 219 Ga. App. 413,465 S.E.2d 521

(1995)).
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 62-63, 483 S.E.2d at 312-13.
Id.
224 Ga. App. 821, 482 S.E.2d 727 (1997).
Id. at 822, 482 S.E.2d at 728.
Id. at 823, 482 S.E.2d at 729.
1l at 823-24, 482 S.E.2d at 729.
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received the driver's premiums, it was primarily responsible for
providing coverage for this collision.ce
0 ' the court of appeals
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Harris,'
dealt
with the procedural aspects of an uninsured motorist subrogation claim.
Travelers paid Harris $85,000 for damages, medical expenses, and lost
wages arising from an accident on July 23, 1992. In August 1995,
Travelers filed suit against Harris to recover the $85,000 payment that
was paid under plaintiff's uninsured motorist coverage. Travelers's
payment was made before a judgment was returned in favor of its
insured against Harris. Harris contended that it was a voluntary
payment for which Travelers was not authorized to seek subrogation."° The court of appeals disagreed. 8 Although the payment
was made before judgment was rendered in favor of its insured, a
judgment against the uninsured motorist is not a condition precedent to
a demand against an insurer under O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11.'"
However, the court found Travelers was not authorized to bring the
action against Harris in its own name.'ce Thus, any action to recover

100. Id. (citing Continental Ins. Co. v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 193 Ga. App. 395,388
S.E.2d 16 (1989)).
101. 226 Ga. App. 269, 486 S.E.2d 427 (1997).
102. Id. at 269, 486 S.E.2d at 427-28.
103. 1d at 270, 486 S.E.2d at 428.
104. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (1992 & Supp. 1997)). This code section provides in
pertinent part:
() An insurer paying a claim under the endorsement or provisions required by
subsection (a) of this Code section shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured
to whom the claim was paid against the person causing such injury, death, or
damage to the extent that payment was made, including the proceeds recoverable
from the assets of the insolvent insurer, provided that the bringing of an action
against the unknown owner or operator as "John Doe" or the conclusion of such
an action shall not constitute a bar to the insured, if the identity of the owner or
operator who caused the injury or damages complained of becomes known,
bringing an action against the owner or operator theretofore proceeded against as
"John Doe"; provided, further, that any recovery against such owner or operator
shall be paid to the insurance company to the extent that the insurance company
paid the named insured in the action brought against the owner or operator as
"John Doe," except that the insurance company shall pay its proportionate part
of any reasonable costs and expense incurred in connection therewith, including
reasonable attorney's fees. Nothing in an endorsement or provisions made under
this Code section nor any other provision of law shall operate to prevent the
joining in an action against "John Doe" or the owner or operator of the motor
vehicle causing such injury as a party defendant, and joinder is specifically
authorized.
O.C.GA. § 33-7-11.
105. 226 Ga. App. at 270, 486 S.E.2d at 428.
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the payment made by the uninsured motorist carrier must be brought
in the name of the insured under the uninsured motorist policy.'"
Probably one of the more important decisions from the supreme court
during the survey period is Duncan v. Integon General Insurance
Corp.1 °7 Duncan brought suit for damages arising out of an automobile collision and served Integon, her uninsured motorist carrier.
Integon filed a counterclaim against Duncan seeking reimbursement of
$5,000 it had previously paid her under the medical payments provisions
of the policy. Duncan settled her $48,148 claim with defendant for
$15,000, its limit of liability. The supreme court granted certiorari to
consider whether the "complete compensation rule" is applicable to an
insurance policy provision that requires the insured to reimburse the
insurer for amounts paid under medical payments coverage.'" The
specific policy provision in Duncan's policy stated: "If we make a
payment under this policy and the person to or for whom payment is
made recovers damages from another, that person shall: 1. Hold in
trust for us the proceeds of the recovery; and 2. reimburse us to the
extent of our payment."'0 9
This provision did not state whether the insured's complete compensation would or would not constitute a limitation on Integon's right of
reimbursement. The supreme court found the absence of an express
Its absence was strictly
provision in the policy to be important.1
construed against Integon and in accordance with the "reasonable
expectations" of Duncan." Therefore, it was held that "in the absence
of an express policy provision to the contrary, 'a medical payments
insurer may exercise its right of subrogation only after the subrogor has
The supreme court went
been fully compensated for its loss.""'
further to buttress this opinion with the following dicta: "We conclude
that Georgia public policy strongly supports the rule that an insurer may
not obtain reimbursement unless and until its insured has been
However, even after making
completely compensated for his losses."

106. I
107. 267 Ga. 646, 482 S.E.2d 325 (1997).
108. Id. at 646,482 S.E.2d at 325-26. This rule "requires that an insured be completely
compensated for his losses before his insurer can exercise a right of subrogation or
reimbursement." Id., 482 S.E.2d at 326.
109. Id
110. Id.
111. Id at 646-47,482 S.E.2d at 326 (citing Roland v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co., 265 Ga. 776, 462 S.E.2d 623 (1995)).
112. I& at 647,482 S.E.2d at 326 (emphasis added) (quoting 8AAPPLEMAN, INSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE, p. 25, § 4903.65 (Supp. 1996-97)).

113. Id.
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this statement, the court limited its decision to the facts of the case by
stating that the "complete compensation rule implicitly applied] because
the reimbursement provision in Ms. Duncan's policy contain[ed] no
'provision to the contrary.' "" 4
Nolley v. Maryland Casualty Insurance Co."' is noteworthy for two
reasons. First, the court of appeals stated that a person can unwittingly
waive uninsured motorist coverage provided by a garage owner because
of the terms of the bailment contract entered into in order to garage a
car.. 6 Second, the opinion reveals some keen insight into one of the
new judges of the court of appeals, Judge Eldridge, and may aid in
predicting the outcome of cases that come before him. The opinion is
scholarly and well-written and demonstrates the proper use and
application of principles of logic to resolve a legal dispute. The opinion
is a good one for a practitioner to read before preparing a brief or oral
argument to be presented before a panel of the court of appeals upon
which Judge Eldridge is sitting.
Nolley left her car at a Toyota dealership for repairs and was given a
"loaner" to use while her car was in the shop. To get the "loaner," she
had to sign an agreement that stated she carried liability, uninsured
motorist, underinsured motorist, and collision coverage. Additionally,
the agreement stated that Nolley "acknowledged" that she would not
expect Kelly Toyota to provide any type of liability, uninsured motorist,
underinsured motorist, or collision coverage with respect to her use of
the "loaner." The Toyota dealership was covered by a commercial garage
policy issued by a subsidiary of Maryland Casualty. The policy provided
uninsured and underinsured coverage that would have covered Nolley.
Maryland Casualty was served in the suit against the tortfeasor arising
from the collision." 7
First, Judge Eldridge reasoned that the case "involve[d] the construction of a bailment contract" and not "the construction of a contract of
insurance between an insured and his insurer and the mandates of the
insurance code."" Then the court noted that unlike liability coverage,
Georgia law does not require the purchase of uninsured or underinsured
motorist coverage."19 It can be waived or rejected. Therefore, because
the dealership was not required to carry the uninsured or underinsured

114. Id. at 648, 482 S.E.2d at 326 (quoting Shelter Ins. Cos. v. Frohlich, 498 N.W.2d
74 (Neb. 1993)).
115. 222 Ga. App. 901, 476 S.E.2d 622 (1996).
116. Id. at 901-02, 476 S.E.2d at 624.
117. Id. at 901, 476 S.E.2d at 623.
118. Id. at 902, 476 S.E.2d at 624.
119. Id. at 904,476 S.E.2d at 624 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 33-34-3 to -4 (1996), which require

minimum limits of liability insurance in Georgia).
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insurance, it could not be required to offer that insurance to Nolley.
Accordingly, she effectively waived any coverage available to her when
she signed the agreement for the "loaner."20 The fact that the contract also provided for waiver of liability coverage did not render the
contract void because the contract was determined to be severable." 1
Therefore, in signing the agreement for the "loaner," Nolley waived her
right to be covered by the uninsured motorist coverage which had been
provided by the Toyota dealer.1"
Williams v. Safeway Insurance Co."2 provides clear guidance to both
plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys in uninsured motorist cases
regarding the proper way to preserve the issue of uninsured motorist
coverage for trial. In this case, Williams sued Cousins for injuries
arising from an auto collision and served the uninsured motorist carrier,
Safeway. Safeway answered in its own name and asserted that Cousin
was not an uninsured motorist. The jury returned a verdict in favor of
Williams. Safeway filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict on the grounds that Williams presented no evidence on whether
Cousin was an uninsured motorist. The trial court granted the motion
because Williams presented no evidence during the trial showing the
existence of her uninsured motorist policy with Safeway or that Cousin
was an uninsured motorist."24
However, on appeal Williams contended she was not required to
present any evidence because neither of these issues was preserved in
the pretrial order. The pretrial order simply stated that the issues for
determination by the jury were negligence, proximate cause, and
damages. 2 ' Because Safeway gained the status of a named party and
contested its liability for uninsured motorist coverage, Williams had the
burden to prove that a policy of insurance containing uninsured motorist
protection existed and that defendant was an uninsured motorist at the
time of the collision. 26 The court determined that in preparing the
pretrial order Safeway was required to preserve any defenses it had, and
plaintiff was required to preserve any claims she had. Furthermore,
failure to do so by an omission in the pretrial order constitutes a waiver

120. Id. at 903-04, 476 S.E.2d at 625 (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(aX3), which allows
rejection of uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 223 Ga. App. 93, 476 S.E.2d at 850 (1996).
124. Id. at 93-94, 476 S.E.2d at 850.
125. Id. at 94, 476 S.E.2d at 851.
126. Id. (citing Hartford Accident Co. v. Studebaker, 139 Ga. App. 386, 228 S.E.2d 322
(1976)).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

192

[Vol. 49

However, although the uninsured motorist
of the claims or issues.'
issues were not set forth in the portion of the pretrial order as issues for
determination by the jury, Safeway's outline of the case contained the
following statement: "Safeway Insurance Company denies that the
defendant is [an] uninsured motorist as defined under Georgia law."'
The court held that this language was sufficient to preserve the issue,
and because of the failure of proof in this regard, the motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict was properly granted by the trial
court.' " Therefore,, it is clear that both parties must include these
uninsured motorist issues in the pretrial order. If those issues are not
in contention, a stipulation should be recited in the pretrial order to that
effect." °
In United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Carroll,'' a claim for medical
payments benefits coverage under an automobile insurance policy issued
to Carroll by USAA was at issue. Ms. Carroll, a seventy-five-year-old
lady, stopped at a service station to get gasoline. She pumped her own
gas and opened the car door to get back inside when she saw a truck
backing towards her. She was afraid she would be struck by the truck
before she could get in her car safely. She began to back away from the
truck by walking along the side of her vehicle and then tried to step up
onto the concrete island. As she did, the approaching truck struck her
car and she simultaneously fell backward into the gas pump and was
injured. She was not sure whether she fell because her car struck her
after it had been hit by the truck or because she tripped on the gasoline
hose while trying to get out of the way of the approaching truck. 3 2
The medical payment provisions of her policy promised payment of
reasonable expenses of bodily injury that occurred "while occupying...
or ... when struck by [ a motor vehicle."" The definition section of
the policy defined occupying as "in, upon, getting in, on, out or off."'"
Relying upon cases decided under the "no fault" statute' to arrive
at a definition of occupancy within the mandate of O.C.G.A. section 33-79,m the court decided that Ms. Carroll "remained an occupant of [her]

127. Id.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 95, 476 S.E.2d at 851-52.
Id., 476 S.E.2d at 852.
Id.
226 Ga. App. 144, 486 S.E.2d 613 (1997).
Id. at 144-45, 486 S.E.2d at 614.
Id. at 146, 486 S.E.2d at 614.

134. Id
135. Id., 486 S.E.2d at 615 (citing O.C.GA. § 33-34-2(8) (1996 & Supp. 1997)).

136. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-9 states:
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car until [she] could reach a neutral zone or could be removed to
one. " ' There was also evidence that Ms. Carroll was a pedestrian
who was struck by the vehicle within the policy provisions, which would
likewise give rise to coverage for the medical benefits under the
policy.1"s The court refused to set aside the jury verdict for statutory
bad faith penalties and attorney fees because there was no question of
law as Ms. Carroll came within the definition of pedestrian and occupier
of the vehicle.' 9 The evidence further indicated that the claims
examiner failed to talk to the eyewitnesses and assumed the absence of
coverage because he believed that Ms. Carroll slipped and fell without
contact with the vehicle or the truck. Therefore, the insurer did not
have "reasonable grounds to exclude coverage based upon a claim that
was not completely investigated." 14° The court did write off an award
of litigation expenses for Ms. Carroll under O.C.G.A. section 13-6-11,141
restating the proposition that O.C.G.A. section 33-4-6' is an exclusive
remedy for bad faith denial of benefits."
Another jury award for bad faith penalties and attorney fees was
affirmed in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Drury.'"
Drury had an auto collision and filed a claim for coverage. State Farm

Vehicle insurance is insurance against loss of or damage to any land vehicle or
aircraft, any draft or riding animal, or to property while contained therein or
thereon or being loaded or unloaded therein or therefrom from any hazard or
cause, and against any loss, liability, or expense resulting from or incident to
ownership, maintenance, or use of any such vehicle, aircraft, or animal, together
with insurance against accidental death or accidental injury to individuals,
including the named insured, while in, entering, alighting from, adjusting,
repairing, cranking, or caused by being struck by a vehicle, aircraft, or draft or
riding animal, if such insurance is issued as a part of insurance on the vehicle,
aircraft, or draft or riding animal; and provisions of medical, hospital, surgical,
and disability benefits to injured persons, funeral and death benefits to
dependents, beneficiaries or personal representatives or persons killed, irrespective of legal liability of the insured, when issued as an incidental coverage with
or supplemental to liability insurance.
137. 226 Ga. App. at 147, 486 S.E.2d at 615.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 14849, 486 S.E.2d at 616-17.
140. Id. at 148, 486 S.E.2d at 616.
141. O.C.G-A. § 13-6-11 (1982 & Supp. 1997). O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 provides:
The expenses of litigation generally shall not be allowed as a part of the damages;
but where the plaintiff has specially pleaded and has made prayer therefore and
where the defendant has acted in bad faith; has been stubbornly litigious, or has
caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense, the jury may allow them.
142. O.C.G. § 334-6 (1992).
143. 226 Ga. App. at 149, 486 S.E.2d at 617.
144. 222 Ga. App. 196, 474 S.E.2d 64 (1996).
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denied coverage stating that it had canceled Drury's policy effective the
very day of the collision for nonpayment of premium. State Farm
contended that it generated and mailed a premium due notice for the
payment due, but Drury maintained that he never saw the bill. He was
not living at the address State Farm had on file because he and his wife
had separated, and he had not notified State Farm of the change of
address. However, Drury's ex-wife testified that she forwarded all of
Drury's mail to him. State Farm put up no evidence that the notice of
premium due was in fact mailed nor did it put up sufficient evidence to
entitle it to the benefit of the favorable presumption that Drury received
the notice. In order to avail oneself of the presumption of receipt, proof
that the notice was placed in an envelope properly addressed to the
insured's last known address with correct postage affixed and duly
mailed is required." The best evidence offered by State Farm was the
deposition of an "operations supervisor" stating that a balance due on
the policy was generated and that "it would have been mailed."'
Thus, the deposition was not based upon personal knowledge of the
supervisor. In view of Drury's direct evidence that he never saw the
notice, the matter was properly left to the jury 147 Because State Farm
could not show that it had canceled the policy as required by law by
giving the required notice of premium due prior to cancellation and
because it refused to pay Drury's claim, the jury award for bad faith
penalties was allowed to stand.' *
Integon General Insurance Corp. v. Gibson149 related to the application of the statutory definition of insurable interest to an automobile
policy."W Fairfax and Gibson purchased a Chevrolet pickup truck and
insured it with Integon. The vehicle was stolen and Integon refused to
pay the total loss to Gibson contending that he had insured only his oneThe court held that Integon
half property interest in the vehicle.'

145. Id. at 196-97, 474 S.E.2d at 65-66.
146. Id. at 197, 474 S.E.2d at 66.
147. Id. at 198-99, 474 S.E.2d at 66.
148. Id. at 202, 474 S.E.2d at 69.
149. 226 Ga. App. 152, 485 S.E.2d 576 (1997).
150. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-4 (1996). O.C.GA. § 33-24-4 provides:
(a) As used in this Code section, "insurable interest" means any actual, lawful, and
substantial economic interest in the safety or preservation of the subject of the
insurance free from loss, destruction, or pecuniary damage or impairment. (b) No
insurance contract on property or of any interest therein or arising therefrom shall
be enforceable except for the benefit of persons having, at the time of the loss, an
insurable interest in the things insured. (c) The measure of an insurable interest
in property is the extent to which the insured might be damnified by loss, injury,
or impairment of such interest in such property.
151. 226 Ga. App. at 152-53, 485 S.E.2d at 576-77.
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was liable for the total loss of the vehicle because Gibson's insurable
interest equaled one hundred percent of the value. 162 Under the terms
and conditions of the note, Gibson was jointly and severally liable for the
entire debt upon which the vehicle was given as security.'"

III. COMMERCIAL GENERAL LiAiLIrY POLICIES
Most of the cases dealing with commercial general liability policies
that were decided by the Georgia Court of Appeals were concerned with
the exclusionary language contained in those policies. For example,
T1fton Machine Works, Inc. v. Colony Insurance Co.' deals with the
ambiguity created by a "care, custody, and control" exclusion and a rider
"to cover the industrial installation of equipment and machinery"'"
In resolving the ambiguity, the court followed the three basic rules of
construction of insurance contracts. They are: (1) all ambiguities must
be construed against the drafter (insurer); (2) exclusions from coverage
must be strictly construed; and (3) insurance contracts are to be read in
accordance with "reasonable expectations of the insureds."' Although
the language of the machine installation rider purchased by Tifton
Machine Works was not included in the opinion, the court determined
that "the insurance policy itself includes no explanation of the parameters of the machine installation rider, and nothing in the policy or the
rider limits coverage of machine installation to incidental damage." 57
Accordingly, the court held that the care, custody, and control clause was
ambiguous when read in context with the machine installation rider.'"
Therefore, Tifton Machine Works could reasonably have expected
coverage on activities related to machine installation. As a result,
coverage was found because the ambiguity was resolved in favor of the
The court reached a similar conclusion with regard to an
insured.'
exclusion covering "your work.""8
Two cases were decided that contained the "business risk" exclusions'' commonly found in commercial general liability policies. In

152. Id. at 155, 485 S.E.2d at 578.

153. Id.
154. 224 Ga. App. 19, 480 S.E.2d 37 (1996).
155. Id. at 20, 480 S.E.2d at 39 (alteration in original).
156. Id. (citing Isdoll v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 219 Ga. App. 516, 466 S.E.2d 48 (1995);
Richards v. Hanover Ins. Co., 250 Ga. 613, 299 S.E.2d 561 (1983)).
157. Id. at 21, 480 S.E.2d at 39.

158. Id.
159. Id. at 21-22, 480 S.E.2d at 39-40.
160. Id. at 22, 480 S.E.2d at 40.
161. The standard exclusion states that the insurance does not apply to:
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the first case, Controlled Blasting, Inc. v. Ranger Insurance Co., " the
court of appeals defined the recognized purpose of a standard comprehensive general liability policy, which is extensively used throughout the
country, as "to provide protection for personal injury or for property
damage caused by the completed product, but not for the replacement
and repair of that product."'" Therefore, the court held that Ranger
did not have any duty to defend its insured contractor because the
allegations of the claim against it were not grounded in tort but were
grounded on a breach of contract claim based on faulty workmanship.' Following the decision in Glens Falls Insurance Co. v. Donmac
Golf Shaping Co.,' the court explained that "'this type of risk is not
covered by the [comprehensive general liability] policy, and the "business
risk" exclusions in the policy make this clear.'"'" Therefore, because
the damages alleged against Ranger's insured arose exclusively from
faulty workmanship, Ranger had no duty to defend the claim.' 7
The other case dealing with the business risk exclusion, Sapp v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,' was also based upon the decision in
Donmac. In this action, Sapp had sued Day, the State Farm insured, for
damages resulting from the negligence of Day in repairing floor joists
and preparing the crawl space of the home to provide adequate
ventilation and moisture barriers. Because of Day's failure to properly
perform this work, the hardwood floors in the home began to cup and
warp. 1
The court, through Judge Eldridge, explained that "'the
coverage applicable under the [commercial general liability] policy is for
tort liability for injury to persons and damage to other property, and not
for contractual liability of the insured for economic loss because the
product or completed work is not that for which the damaged person

... "Property damage' to "impaired property" or property that has not been
physically injured, arising out of: (1) A defect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous
condition in "your product" or "Your work;" or (2) A delay or failure by you or
anyone acting on your behalf to perform a contract or agreement in accordance
with its terms. This exclusion does not apply to the loss of use of other property
arising out of sudden and accidental physical injury to "your product" or "your
work" after it has been put to its intended use.
Controlled Blasting v. Ranger Ins. Co., 225 Ga. App. 373, 374, 484 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1997).
162. 225 Ga. App. 373, 484 S.E.2d 47 (1997).
163. Id. at 375, 484 S.E.2d at 49.
164. Id. at 375-76, 484 S.E.2d at 49.
165. Id. at 375, 484 S.E.2d at 49 (citing 203 Ga. App. 508, 417 S.E.2d 197 (1992)).
166. Id. (quoting 203 Ga. App. at 511, 417 S.E.2d at 200).
167. Id. at 375-76, 484 S.E.2d at 49.
168. 226 Ga. App. 200, 486 S.E.2d 71 (1997).
169. Id. at 200-01, 486 S.E.2d at 72-73.
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bargained. '""7 Because "a simple examination of appellant's complaint
... [made] it clear that all his claimed damages relate directly to the
cost of repairing or replacing the alleged negligent work," the court
liability in this regard was excluded under
found that coverage for17Day's
1
the State Farm policy.
First Financial Insurance Co. v. American Sandblasting Co.'7"
demonstrates the harm that can befall an insurer for failing to follow
another well-known rule of insurance contract construction. The rule is
"'if an insurance contract is capable of being construed two ways, it will
be construed against the insurance company and in favor of the
insured.'"' 73 Here, plaintiff, American Sandblasting, was insured by
First Financial. The policy provided coverage for painting of structures
three stories or less in height. While painting a bridge less than three
stories, paint overspray damaged vehicles on a car dealer's lot.
American Sandblasting, after filing a claim with the insurer that was
denied, paid the damages to the car dealer and in turn filed this action
more than sixty days after a demand was made seeking bad faith
penalties and attorney fees from First Financial. First Financial's sole
defense was based upon an exclusion which provided that the insurance
did not apply to property damage arising out of "bridge operations." 174
Not only did the court find the clause ambiguous, but it agreed with
American Sandblasting that coverage was provided. 1 75 It also rejected
defendant's contention that bad faith penalties and attorney fees were
improper in the case. 76 The court chastised First Financial because
it was clear that the term "operations" was capable of more than one
interpretation when given a common dictionary meaning, and First
Financial knew the "well-known" rule would be followed in construing
the policy. 177 The court further noted that First Financial failed to
follow "the recommended procedure for contesting coverage" and affirmed
the award of penalties and attorney fees.7"

170. Id. at 204,486 S.E.2d at 75 (quoting Glenns Falls, 203 Ga. App. at 511,417 S.E.2d

at 200).
171. Id.
172. 223 Ga. App. 232, 477 S.E.2d 390 (1996).
173. Id. at 233, 477 S.E.2d at 392 (quoting Claussen v. Aetna Cas. Co., 259 Ga. 333,

334-35, 380 S.E.2d 686, 688 (1989)).
174. Id. at 232-33, 477 S.E.2d at 391-92.
175. Id. at 233, 477 S.E.2d at 392.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id at 234, 477 S.E.2d at 392 (citing Hilde v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 184 Ga. App. 611,
362 S.E.2d 69 (1987)).
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Whether an insurer had a duty to defend its insured was the subject
matter of three cases relating to commercial policies. The first of these,
79
Penn-America Insurance Co. v. Disabled American Veterans, Inc.,
outlines the analysis to be followed in these types of cases. The process
is to review the allegations of the complaint to determine whether a
liability covered by the policy is asserted. The issue is not whether the
insured is "actually liable to the plaintiff."'80 Here, Penn-America
refused to defend Disabled American Veterans, ("DAV"), in a suit
brought by Farley who slipped and fell on the premises of the DAV.
Penn-America contended that Farley, a waitress, was injured within the
scope of her employment. Even though summary judgment had been
granted to DAV in the case brought by Farley, this was not determinative of Penn-America's obligation to defend its insured. Penn-America
still had a duty to defend the action before its insured received the
favorable ruling.31 ' "The insurer is obligated to defend a suit both
when the true facts are within the coverage of the policy, and also when
the complaint alleges facts within the policy's coverage.""8 2 Probably
the strongest statement of the rule in this case is: "If the facts as
alleged in the complaint bring the occurrence even arguably within the
policy's coverage, the insurer has a duty to defend the action regardless
of whether liability is ultimately established.""s
However, the court did not follow this rule in two cases decided upon
facts concerning the "assault and battery exclusion " '" in a commercial
policy. The first of these cases, Boomer's, Inc. v. Whitney,"s arose out
of an instance in which a patron at Boomer's, a tavern, shot Whitney in
the face. The complaint alleged that Boomer's "failed to exercise
reasonable care for its customers and that it knew the patron was
violent, but permitted him on the premises."'" Boomer's insurer,
Northwestern National Insurance Company, refused to defend the case
based upon an endorsement excluding cases based on assault and
battery. 7 The court stated that "the assault and battery exclusion
applie[d] to the facts in this case, notwithstanding the complaint's

179. 224 Ga. App. 557, 481 S.E.2d 850 (1997).
180. Id. at 558, 481 S.E.2d at 851.
181. Id. at 557-58, 481 S.E.2d at 850-51 (citing St. Paul Fire Co. v. Mitchell, 164 Ga.
App. 215, 296 S.E.2d 126 (1982)).
182. Id. at 559, 481 S.E.2d at 852.
183. Id. (emphasis added).
184. This commonly used exclusion states: "IN]o coverage shall apply under this policy
for any claim, demand or suit based upon assault and battery."
185. 226 Ga. App. 195, 486 S.E.2d 59 (1997).
186. Id. at 195, 486 S.E.2d at 59-60.
187. Id., 486 S.E.2d at 60.
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allegations of premises liability.""s The court attempted to justify this
conclusion by stating that the underlying controversy upon which the
premises liability action was based was assault and battery."9 There
is absolutely no mention of the rule in Penn-America. On the contrary,
the court decided the case on an older case, Al Who Enterprises,Inc. v.
Capitol Indemnity Corp.'
However, Al Who appears factually
distinguishable from the situation presented in Boomer's because Al Who
related to an assault by nightclub employees and not by a patron.'91
Furthermore, the complaint in Al Who alleged intentional acts.'
The insured, L. Carter Post 4472 Veterans of Foreign Wars, Inc.,
("VFW"), was also "boomeranged" by the court of appeals in Capitol
Indemnity Corp. v. L. Carter Post 4472 Veterans of Foreign Wars,
Inc.'
This case arose from a stabbing endured by one patron of the
VFW at the hands of another patron. The VFW was sued in a complaint
contending that "it had negligently allowed [the stabber] to reenter the
VFW after he had been asked to leave due to intoxication and vulgarity." 9 The language of the exclusion in this case was slightly different
than in Boomer's.95 Following Al Who again, the court held that
Capitol Indemnity Corporation did not owe a defense to its insured, the
VFW.'
Once again, the court relied upon a case which was distinguishable in its facts and did not apply the general rules of construction
of insurance policies to reach a decision. It is unfortunate that certiorari
was not sought in this case.
Whether an insurer had an obligation to defend its insured in a sexual
harassment and assault and battery case was the question in O'Dell v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co."9 7 In the underlying action,
plaintiff sought damages for claims of "assault, battery, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, sexual harassment, and negligent
retention of employment."' The court in this case applied the proper
rule but still found the insured was not entitled to a defense in the

188. Id. at 196, 486 S.E.2d at 60 (emphasis added).
189. Id
190. 217 Ga. App. 423, 457 S.E.2d 696 (1995).
191. See generally id.
192. Id, at 424, 457 S.E.2d at 697.
193. 225 Ga. App. 354, 484 S.E.2d 52 (1997).
194. Id. at 354, 484 S.E.2d at 53.
195. The exclusion stated, "[Tibis insurance does not apply to bodily injury ... or
personal injury arising out of assault, battery or assault and battery." Id.
196. Id. at 355, 484 S.E.2d at 54 (citing Al Who, 217 Ga. App. 423, 457 S.E.2d at 696).
197. 223 Ga. App. 578, 478 S.E.2d 418 (1996).
198. Id. at 578, 478 S.E.2d at 419.
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The decision was based upon the definition of
underlying case.
"bodily injury" in the policy, and a defense was not required because
plaintiff failed to allege that her emotional distress resulted from
physical harm or injury. Therefore, the allegations did not constitute
"bodily injury" as defined by the policy. The court further explained its
decision was justified because the policies required that the bodily injury
arise out of an "event."' This term was defined as "an accident,
including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same
The court followed a definition of
general harmful conditions." °
accident which "refers to an unexpected happening rather than one
occurring through intention or design" and determined that because the
sexual harassment and assault and battery are by their nature
intentional, there was no covered "event.' °
In Bates v. Guaranty National Insurance Co.,' Guaranty National
sought a declaratory judgment that its policy provided no coverage for
its insured for claims arising from a shoving incident between a store
employee and a customer. The analysis followed by the court in this
decision was the same as in O'Dell. First, the court determined the
policy excluded "bodily injury or property damage expected or intended
The court held the injuries
from the standpoint of the insured." '
by
the
policy
because the underlying
were not "bodily injuries" covered
complaint alleged '"only mental pain and anguish."' 5 Second, the
court determined the physical injuries alleged were incurred as a result
of the intentional shoving of the customer by the employer, and therefore
the claims were also excluded.'
A different result would probably have been reached in each of these
"duty to defend" cases if the court had applied the general rule of
construction to an exclusion, construing it narrowly to broaden the
However, the court, at least
coverage purchased by the insured.'
from a review of these decisions, does not appear to be predisposed to
use this rule in the construction of exclusionary provisions that deal with
assault and battery type cases.

199. Id. at 580, 478 S.E.2d at 420.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

1d
Id.
1d
223 Ga. App. 11, 476 S.E.2d 797 (1996).
Id. at 12, 476 S.E.2d at 798 (emphasis added).
Id. at 13, 476 S.E.2d at 798-99.
Id.
See Richards v. Hanover Ins. Co., 250 Ga. 613, 299 S.E.2d 561 (1983).
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The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari in Roberts v. Burke
County School District' to determine which of two insurance policies
insuring the school district applied to an incident in which a student was
killed. The five-year-old child was a kindergarten student in the Burke
County Schools and rode the school district's buses to and from school.
The bus picked him up across from his home but dropped him off about
a half-mile away. The pickup spot was on the approved bus route but
the drop off site was not. The school district permitted the irregular
drop off. The boy was struck by a van when he ran across the road
while walking home after school with some other children. At the time
of his injury, he was about four-tenths of a mile from the place where he
was dropped off by the bus, and the bus was two miles away from the
drop off site. The school district had an auto liability policy issued by
Unison Insurance Company and a comprehensive liability policy issued
The Unison policy contained a
by Illinois Insurance Exchange.'
$500,000 limit, and the Illinois Insurance Exchange policy contained a
limit of $1,000,000. But the policy also contained an exclusion for
damages arising from the "ownership, maintenance, operation, use, or
loading or unloading of a vehicle."210
The trial court, in a bench trial, concluded the school district was
negligent in its selection and implementation of the unsafe route and in
its training and supervision of the bus driver.2" In a fact specific
decision, the supreme court agreed with the trial court that the boy's
death could not be said to have arisen from the "use of the school bus
within the contemplation of the ... [Illinois Insurance Exchange
exclusion]."
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Fletcher stated "the
majority offers no clarity to the bench and bar, but simply reviews the
evidence and reaches a contrary result.'2 18
In Park 'N Go of Georgia, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co.,2"4 the supreme court responded to a question certified from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Park 'N Go
operated a parking-shuttle service near the Atlanta Airport. Its facility
consisted of a fenced, flat-surfaced, thirteen-acre parking lot with
entrance and exit gates at the front. To enter, a patron would drive his
vehicle along side a ticket machine at the entrance gate to receive a

208.
209.
210.
211.

267 Ga. 665, 482 S.E.2d 283 (1997).
Id. at 665-66, 482 S.E.2d at 284-85.
Id. at 666, 482 S.E.2d at 284.

Id.
212. Id. at 668-69, 482 S.E.2d at 286.
213. Id. at 669, 482 S.E.2d at 286 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
214. 266 Ga. 787, 471 S.E.2d 500 (1996).
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ticket, and when he left he would present the ticket at a cashier's
window near the exit. U.S.F.& G. issued a policy of insurance to Park
'N Go. The policy included a garage coverage part-liability coverage with
a $1,000,000 limit, a garage keeper's coverage with a $250,000 limit, and
a commercial general liability coverage with a $1,000,000 liability
limit.21 The garage keeper's liability and the commercial general
liability coverages expressly excluded liability for "personal property in
the care, custody or control" of the insured.216 The garage keeper's
coverage provided coverage for sums the insured was legally obligated
to pay for loss to an auto left in the "insured's care while the 'insured'
[was] attending, servicing, repairing, parking or storing" the vehicle.2 17
The Park 'N Go lot was flooded, and more than 200 automobiles were
damaged. The owners of the vehicles filed a class action alleging the
existence of a bailment relationship. After the filing of that complaint,
U.S.F.& G. filed its complaint against Park 'N Go seeking a declaratory
judgment regarding its obligations under the insurance policy.
The specific question considered by the supreme court on certiorari
was whether the care, custody, or control exclusion limited U.S.F.& G.'s
liability under the policy to $250,000.218 The court determined the
relationship between the customers and Park 'N Go was a bailment
relationship, and under those circumstances the property which is
subject to the bailment is within the "'care, custody and control' of the
insured within the meaning of [that] coverage exclusion."21 The court
found the garage keeper's policy bridged the gap in coverages created by
the bailment exclusion in the garage keeper's liability and the commercial general liability portions of the policy.22 Therefore, U.S.F.& G.'s
liability to Park 'N Go and the owners of the vehicles was limited to
$250,000.221

IV.

HOMEOWNERS PoLIcIEs

Southern Fire & Casualty Co. v. Jamerson22 2 arose from an incident
in which Matthew, a five-year-old, was killed when a tractor owned by
Jamerson, the insured under Southern Fire's homeowner's policy, rolled
over him. Matthew resided with Jamerson and his wife. The policy

215.

Id. at 787-89, 471 S.E.2d at 501-02.

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 789, 471 S.E.2d at 502.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 790, 471 S.E.2d at 503.
Id. at 791, 471 S.E.2d at 503.
Id.
223 Ga. App. 582, 479 S.E.2d 404 (1996).
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contained the following exclusion, "personal liability [coverage] does not
apply to ... bodily injury to you or an insured within the meaning of
part a. or b. of 'insured' as defined."' The policy defined "insured" as
"you and residents of your household who are: a. your relatives; or b.
other persons under the age of 21 and in the care of any person named
above."'
Because Matthew was under the supervision of his mother
who was a resident relative of Jamerson's wife, Matthew was an insured
under the homeowner's policy; therefore, personal liability coverage did
not extend to his death.'
In Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co.,226 an automobile insurer, St. Paul, sought indemnity or contribution from a homeowner's insurer, Cincinnati. The homeowner's policy
was issued to Dr. Muhanna and contained an auto endorsement which
provided primary coverage of $300,000 per occurrence on an Oldsmobile
automobile owned by Dr. Muhanna. On the date when coverage under
the renewalpolicy was to begin, Dr. Muhanna was issued an automobile
insurance policy by St. Paul which also included $300,000 in coverage for
the Oldsmobile. Several days later, Dr. Muhanna's wife had a collision
while she was driving the Oldsmobile. Cincinnati received payment
from Dr. Muhanna after the collision for renewal coverage on the auto
endorsement under the homeowner's policy. Once Cincinnati learned of
the St. Paul policy, it considered its policy terminated and refunded the
premium to Dr. Muhanna. Cincinnati also had issued a personal
umbrella liability endorsement to its policy prior to the collision. This
umbrella contained limits of $1,000,000.
When suit was filed against Dr. Muhanna for damages resulting from
the collision, Cincinnati refused to participate in the defense. St. Paul
assumed the defense and ultimately paid $153,550 in settlement and
incurred $3,608.90 in defense costs. This suit was brought by St. Paul
to recover those costs.22 7 However, the Cincinnati policy contained the
following terms, "Ifyou obtain other insurance on your covered auto, any
similar insurance provided by this policy will terminate as to that auto
on the effective date of the other insurance."22 The policy language
in the Cincinnati policy was not found to be repugnant to Georgia

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 582, 479 S.E.2d at 405.
Id
Id. at 583, 479 S.E.2d at 406.
222 Ga. App. 190, 474 S.E.2d 78 (1996).
Id. at 190-91, 474 S.E.2d at 79.
Id. at 191, 474 S.E.2d at 79.
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law.' Even though Dr. Muhanna did not attempt to effect a termination by the purchase of the St. Paul policy, he was charged with the duty
to read the policy and therefore was presumed to know that the policy
coverage would terminate when he obtained coverage from St. Paul. As
to the umbrella endorsement issued by Cincinnati, it, like other umbrella
coverages, "[was] regarded as true excess over and above any type of
primary coverage.'
In Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. Law,"i the court applied a
general rule of damages and affirmed a verdict in favor of plaintiff for
the amount of the replacement cost "at the time of trial. 82 In doing
so, the court deprived the insurer of the protection of the language of its
policy that required the damages to be determined at the time of the loss.
However, the court did write off the amount awarded by the jury for bad
faith penalties finding that Grange had a reasonable basis to contest the
claim because the insured had a motive to start the fire due to financial
problems; the fire was intentionally started from the inside of the house;
and a factual issue was presented as to who, including the insureds, had
an opportunity to start the fire.'
Owens u. Georgia Underwriting Ass'n 21 pertained to a claim by a
mortgagee under the terms of a homeowner's policy on a dwelling
destroyed by fire. On the date of the fire loss, the balance on the
mortgage was $20,117.32. Owens made a claim in this amount shortly
after the fire. The claim was denied because the insured, Harris, who
had been arrested and charged with arson in the burning of the house,
had not made a claim under the policy. Before suit was brought, Owens,
the mortgagee, paid Harris $1,300 for her equity and redemption in the
lots that the burned house sat on and thereafter sold the lots to third
parties for $10,000. After the contractual limitation period of twelve
months ran barring the insured Harris's claim under the policy, Georgia
Underwriting demanded the deed to secure debt be transferred and
assigned by Owens in connection with an offer to pay Owens. Owens

229. Id., 474 S.E.2d at 79-80 (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-2445(a) (1996)). O.C.GA.. § 33-2445(a) provides in part: "[tlermination of any coverage under the policy whether by
cancellation or nonrenewal shall be effective on the effective date of any other policy
providing similar coverage on the same motor vehicle or any replacement of coverage."
230. Id. at 191-92, 474 S.E.2d at 80.
231. 223 Ga. App. 748, 479 S.E.2d 357 (1996).
232. Id. at 750, 479 S.E.2d at 359 (citing O.C.GA § 13-6-4 (1982)). O.C.G.A. § 13-6-4
provides: "The question of damages being one for the jury, a reviewing court should not
interfere unless the damages are either so small or so excessive as to justify the inference
of gross mistake or undue bias."
233. 1&
234. 223 Ga. App. 29, 476 S.E.2d 810 (1996).
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made it impossible to settle under the policy terms by assigning the deed
to secure debt in return for payment of the loan balance. Therefore, the
insurer, Georgia Underwriting, offered to pay Owens his economic loss
after set off for the sales price of the lots, taxes, and the amount paid to
Harris to get title. This offer was rejected, but after suit was filed,
Georgia Underwriting tendered the undisputed amount (the amount of
its offer) into court contending that was the limit of its liability under
the policy. The policy stated that any loss payable to the mortgagee
would be paid "as interest appear."' The court noted that this term
limited the insurance claim to the actual interest held by the claimant
Furthermore, the court recognized "[tihe
at the time of the loss.'
mortgagee's interest must be determined as of the date of loss so that
the mortgagee receives no more than nor less than is due."237 Therefore, under the facts of the case, it was proper for the court to use an
economic loss analysis to determine the amount owed the mortgagee
under the terms of the policy.38 The mortgagee was not, however,
allowed to recover interest on the note which occurred after the date of
the loss because the "loss becomes fixed at the time of the casualty.' z
It is hard to explain why this rule was not followed in Law on the
insured's claim under the policy.
Homeowner's policies generally have a one-year contractual limitation
period within which suit must be brought under the terms of the policy.
This type of provision was the subject of the court's opinion in Appleby
v. Merastar Insurance Co. 2" Appleby's burglary loss occurred on
November 27, 1993. She promptly reported the loss, and on February
23, 1994, she was examined under oath by the insurer. Thereafter, the
insurer's attorney requested a second examination under oath and
proposed that it be scheduled for June 28, 1994. The second examination was rescheduled for August 9, 1994, and then rescheduled for
August 27, 1994. At some point during this time, Appleby moved to
Florida, and the parties began arguing over the date and site for the
second examination. The examination was eventually rescheduled to
take place in Florida on November 4, 1994, but Appleby canceled it.
Appleby contended that the parties agreed to conduct the examination
235. Id. at 29-30, 476 S.E.2d at 811-12.
236. Id. at 31-32, 476 S.E.2d at 813.
237. Id. at 31, 476 S.E.2d at 812.
238. Id Such an analysis as used in this case allowed the offset from the amount due
at the time of the loss of the receipts from the sale of the lots. In addition, the mortgagee
was allowed to recover the sum spent to protect his interest in the property by paying the
delinquent taxes and purchasing the lots from the insured.
239. Id at 32, 476 S.E.2d at 813.
240. 223 Ga. App. 463, 477 S.E.2d 887 (1996).
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on January 6, 1995, or February 6, 1995. Merastar's attorney wrote a
letter asking that the examination be readjourned on January 6, to
which Appleby's counsel agreed. Appleby's counsel filed an affidavit
stating that the parties agreed to conduct the examination on February
6, 1995.241
The court recognized the validity of the one-year contract limitation in
the policy as "valid and binding on the parties.' 2 The court stated an
insurer can waive this limitation if "its 'investigations, negotiations or
assurances ...up to and past the period of limitation ...lead the
insured to believe the limitation would not apply.'"' 4 A jury question
was found to be presented on the issue of waiver, although Georgia law
allows an insurer to investigate claims after the contract limitation
period expires without waiving the limitation. 2' Thus, the prudent
course of action for practitioners is to conclude an investigation and
make a decision on the claim prior to the expiration of the one-year
limitation period contained in the policy to avoid the problem faced by
Merastar.
V. DisABILrrY POLIcIEs
The most important provision of a disability insurance policy is the
definition of disability contained in the policy. This was the subject of
Parker v. PrudentialInsurance Co. of America.245 Parker was issued
a group policy by Prudential that provided disability insurance coverage
to members of the American Institute of CPAs. Parker was a CPA but
was employed by Georgia Pacific Corporation in a high-level management position. Parker was accepted as an insured under the policy in
1984. In 1986, Parker earned in excess of $240,000. In 1987, while he
was still insured under the policy, he stopped working for Georgia
Pacific as a result of a disabling illness diagnosed as "chronic brain
241. Id. at 463-64, 477 S.E.2d at 887-88.
242. Id. at 464, 477 S.E.2d at 888.
243. Id. (quoting SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. v. Georgia Farm Ins. Co., 203 Ga. App. 40,

41, 416 S.E.2d 322, 323 (1992)).
244. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-24-40 (1996)). O.C.G.A. § 33-24-40 states:
Without limitation of any right or defense of an insurer otherwise, none of the
following acts by or on behalf of an insurer shall be deemed to constitute a waiver
of any provision of a policy or of any defense of the insurer under the policy: (1)
Acknowledgment of the receipt of notice of loss or claim under the policy; (2)
Furnishing forms for reporting a loss or claim, for giving information relative to
the loss or claim, or for making proof of loss or receiving or acknowledging receipt
of any forms or proofs completed or uncompleted; or (3) Investigating any loss or
claim under any policy or engaging in negotiations looking toward a possible
settlement of any loss or claim.
245. 224 Ga. App. 865, 482 S.E.2d 483 (1997).
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syndrome," an illness which included frequent severe migraine headaches, short term memory loss, and inability to concentrate. Parker
applied for payment of total benefits under the Prudential policy and
was paid at the rate of $5,000 per month. In October 1994, Prudential
stopped paying the benefits and told him that he no longer qualified as
"totally disabled" under the policy. At the time, he was working full
time as a self-employed CPA with a yearly income of less than $45,000."6

The policy provision stated that an insured is totally disabled when he
is "completely unable to engage in any and every occupation for which
he is reasonably fitted by education, training or experience ...

[and

when he] is not engaged in any gainful occupation."247 The court found
the definition of total disability in the policy indicated the policy was not
an occupational disability policy but was a nonoccupational policy.2'
The court refused to give a strict and literal interpretation to this policy
definition because it would require the insured to be "absolutely
helpless" before qualifying under the policy for total disability.249 The
court stated,
An insured is considered to be totally disabled only if he is unable to
perform "some substantial part of the duties of his profession or of such
other work, if any, approximating the same livelihood, as he might be
fairly expected to follow in view of his station, circumstances, and
physical and mental capabilities."'
Because of the specific circumstances in this case, the change in type of
employment, the disparity of income, and the nature of the disability,
the court found a jury question was presented on whether Parker was
totally disabled and entitled to benefits. 1
The other disability policy under consideration by the court during the
survey period was Brown v. JMIC Life Insurance Co. 252 The policy
was a credit disability policy which was issued to Brown when she
purchased an automobile. The application contained a statement that

246. Id. at 865-66, 482 S.E.2d at 484-85.
247. Id. at 866-67, 482 S.E.2d at 485.
248. Id. at 868, 482 S.E.2d at 485. An occupational disability policy provides benefits
to the insured for disability from engaging in his particular occupation. A nonoccupational

policy provides benefits to the insured only if he is totally disabled from engaging in any
gainful work.
249. Id.
250. Id. (quoting Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Barron, 198 Ga. 1, 8, 30 S.E.2d 879, 884
(1944)).
251. Id. at 869, 482 S.E.2d at 486.
252. 222 Ga. App. 670, 474 S.E.2d 645 (1996).
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she, to the best of her knowledge and belief during the past year, had
not been treated "for... any disease of the... circulatory system."2
Brown had been taking prescription medicine for vascular disease prior
to the issuance of the policy. The issue was whether taking this
medicine constituted "treatment." The court relied on the Webster's
definition of treatment.2' Taking prescription medication was found
to be "treatment" using the word's ordinary and popular sense.
Therefore, summary judgment to the insurer was affirmed. 2"
VI. POLICY NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
Every liability policy contains a provision that acts as a condition
precedent to bar the insurer's liability under the policy if timely notice
of a claim thereunder is not made, except in those cases of mandatory
motor vehicle liability insurance coverage. 2" Southeastern Express
Systems, Inc. v. Southern Guaranty Insurance Co. of Georgia. concerned this type of provision. Barnes was a principal of Southeastern
Brokerage Company, the insured under policies issued by Southern
Guaranty. Barnes and Southeastern were sued, and a few days after
service, Barnes talked with his brother-in-law, an independent insurance
broker who placed the coverage for Barnes with Southern Guaranty, and
told him of the lawsuits. However, Dortch told Barnes the policy did not
provide coverage. In accepting that opinion, Barnes made no further
effort to file a claim with Southern Guaranty. Later, after defense costs
had mounted to over $1,000,000, Barnes filed a notice of claim to obtain
payment of the defense costs. He gave notice of the claim to Southern
Guaranty over a year after the suit was filed but did not send a copy of
the complaint or amended complaint. 258 First, the court held that
notice to Dortch, the independent agent, was not notice to the insurer,
Southern Guaranty, because independent insurance agents are generally

253.

Id. at 670, 474 S.E.2d at 646.

254. Id. at 672,474 S.E.2d at 647 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 2435
(3rd ed. 1986). "Treatment" is defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary
as "[t]he action or manner of treating a patient medically or surgically." WEBSTER'S,
supra, at 2435. "Treat" is defined as "to cure for (as a patient or part of the body)
medically or surgically; deal with by medical or surgical means; give a medical treatment

to." Id.
255. 222 Ga. App. at 672, 474 S.E.2d at 647.
256. See Arnica Mut. Ins. v. Bougault, 263 Ga. 157, 429 S.E.2d 908 (1993); Benhill v.
State Farm Fire Co., 175 Ga. App. 97, 239 S.E.2d 189 (1985); Richmond v. Georgia Farm
Bureau Co., 140 Ga. App. 215, 231 S.E.2d 245 (1976); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. J.B. Forest,
132 Ga. App. 714, 209 S.E.2d 6 (1974).

257. 224 Ga. App. 697, 482 S.E.2d 433 (1997).
258. Id. at 697-99, 482 S.E.2d at 434-35.
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considered the agent of the insured and not the insurer."' The court
then held that the failure to provide notice of the suit for over a year
was a violation of the express terms of the policy and affirmed the grant
of summary judgment to Southern Guaranty in the case.' °
Morgan v. Guaranty National Cos.2 ' was a declaratory judgment
action brought by the insurer, Guaranty National, against Morgan to
determine whether Guaranty National was liable for a judgment
obtained by Morgan against its insured, CSM. The underlying case was
a suit filed by Morgan against CSM, his employer, for false imprisonment and conversion because CSM withheld child support payments that
had been automatically deducted from his salary by agreement, but CSM
failed to forward the sums to the court. Morgan filed suit against CSM
after he was arrested for nonpayment of child support. CSM employed
counsel and answered Morgan's lawsuit but failed to provide Guaranty
National with notice of the lawsuit for almost seven months. After
receiving notice of the claim, Guaranty National obtained a reservation
of rights from CSM and investigated the claim. CSM's lawyers withdrew
and notified Guaranty National of the withdrawal, but no appearance
was made on behalf of CSM when the case appeared on the calendar.
CSM's answer was stricken, and the damage issue was tried to the jury,
which awarded Morgan $37,500 in actual damages and $50,000 in
punitive damages. 2 The policy issued to CSM required it to notify
Guaranty National "as soon as practicable of an occurrence or of an
offense which may result in a claim."2" CSM offered no explanation
for its failure to provide proper notice, and its failure to provide notice
was undisputed. Therefore, summary judgment was appropriately
granted to Guaranty National in the case.2'
This decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of Georgia, 2'
holding that a declaratory judgment "is not available to a party merely
to test the viability of its defenses."" Since the judgment had been
obtained prior to the filing of the declaratory judgment action, any
defenses to a claim under the policy can be presented in response to a
suit by the insured.

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at 700-01, 482 S.E.2d at 436.
Id. at 701, 482 S.E.2d at 436.
223 Ga. App. 41, 477 S.E.2d 26 (1996).
Id. at 41-42, 477 S.E.2d at 26-27.
Id. at 42, 477 S.E.2d at 27.
Id. at 42-43, 477 S.E.2d at 28.
Morgan v. Guaranty Nat1 Cos., 268 Ga. 343, 489 S.E.2d 803 (1997).
Id. at 345, 489 S.E.2d at 806.

210

MERCER LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 49

Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hipps 7 related to the failure
to provide notice in accordance with the requirements of an automobile
policy issued by Cotton States. Hipps's son had an automobile collision
with others. The others had liability insurance coverage with Travelers.
Suit was filed against the Travelers' insureds on April 21, 1995. A year
later, Hipps's attorney advised Cotton States that he had drawn
counterclaims in the suit he filed for Hipps. This was the first notice
Cotton States had of the collision." The Cotton States policy provided:
We must be notified promptly, but in no event later than [sixty] days,
of how, when and where the accident or loss happened ... receipt of

such notice by the company or any of its authorized agents shall be a
condition precedent to the existence of any coverage under this policy
and of the company's obligation to defend any claim under this
policyM
These provisions were binding upon Hipps, and Cotton States was
relieved of any obligations under the policy because of his failure to
provide the required notice. The court explained that this provision was
found to be enforceable because the opposing party had access to
uninsured motorist coverage under their own policies.2 This decision,
as Judge Blackburn noted in his special concurring opinion, "'ignores the
fact that public policy provides that victims should be compensated
primarily by liability insurance and that uninsured271motorist coverage
was intended to be secondary or backup coverage.'"
In Guaranty National Insurance Co. v. Brock, -2 the provision of the
policy requiring notice of the occurrence and the provision requiring
notice of suit were at issue. The questions arose out of the conduct of
Brock, a transportation supervisor of Baldwin County School District.
A Baldwin County school bus had a collision in which three minors were
alleged to have been injured. Each of them filed separate lawsuits
claiming the bus driver, the school district, and Brock as defendants.
Brock's liability was based upon his alleged negligence in hiring and
retaining the bus driver. Brock was insured under a policy issued to
members of the Professional Association of Georgia Educators.

267. 224 Ga. App. 756, 481 S.E.2d 876 (1997).

268. Id. at 756, 481 S.E.2d at 877.
269. Id., 481 S.E.2d at 877-78.
270. Id. at 756-57,481 S.E.2d at 878 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Drawdy,

217 Ga. App. 236, 456 S.E.2d 745 (1995)).
271. Id. at 758, 481 S.E.2d at 878 (Blackburn, J., concurring specially) (quoting

Drawdy, 217 Ga. App. at 243, 456 S.E.2d at 750 (Blackburn, J., dissenting)).
272. 222 Ga. App. 294, 474 S.E.2d 46 (1996).
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Brock first notified the association of the lawsuits approximately one
year after the collision and did not send them copies of the complaints
The
in the cases until between one and five weeks had gone by,
policy required notice of an occurrence "as soon as practicable" and that
suit be forwarded "immediately. 274 The court found it was not
unreasonable for Brock to fail to foresee that he might be named as a
defendant in the lawsuits and in view of this, his notice of the occurrence
was proper and timely.275 However, the court could not say that his
delay in providing notice of the suits was justifiable and reasonable as
a matter of law and therefore a jury question was presented.2 76
There was also a dispute in this case about whether Brock was
covered because the general insuring clause provided coverage for
activities of an insured in the course of duty as an employee of any
school system. However, an exclusion stated that acts arising out of the
"ownership, maintenance, operation, use, loading or unloading of...
vehicles of any kind" other than supervising students entering or exiting
school buses were excluded. 7 The court applied the three well-known
rules for construction of insurance contracts. 278 Negligent hiring was
not one of the circumstances specified in the exclusion, and Brock was
entitled to have the policy exclusion strictly construed in his favor.
Therefore, as a matter of law he did not fall within the policy's exclusion
and was entitled to coverage under the policy subject to the jury's
determination of whether notification of the lawsuits was justifiable and
reasonable.Y9
VII.

MISCELLANEOUS

The only question under consideration in Dubose v. Ross' was
whether a mistrial should have been granted because plaintiff related a
conversation in which he had asked defendant whether he had insurance, to which defendant responded "yes." When this occurred during
the trial, defense counsel immediately made a motion for mistrial. The

273.

Id. at 294-95, 474 S.E.2d at 47-48.

274. Id. at 295, 474 S.E.2d at 48.
275. Id. at 296, 474 S.E.2d at 48.
276. Id.
277.

Id., 474 S.E.2d at 49.

278. Id. at 296-97, 474 S.E.2d at 49. Any ambiguities in the contract are strictly
construed against the insurer as drafter of the document, any exclusion from coverage

sought to be involved by the insurer is likewise strictly construed, and insurance contracts
are to be read in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured where
possible. Id. at 296, 474 S.E.2d at 49.
279. Id., 474 S.E.2d at 48-49.
280. 222 Ga. App. 99, 473 S.E.2d 179 (1996).
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trial court denied the motion, rebuked plaintiff's counsel, and instructed
the jury that insurance had nothing to do with the case and that they
were to disregard any reference made thereto."l The jury returned a
verdict for plaintiff.
On appeal, the court stated:
In Georgia the injection into a case of testimony pertaining to liability
insurance does not automatically require a grant of a motion for
mistrial. It is only where testimony is so obviously prejudicial in its
nature that its adverse effect cannot be eradicated from the minds of
the jury or its consequences avoided by proper cautionary instructions
from the court, that a mistrial should be granted. 2
These matters are left to the discretion of the judge and the court of
appeals refused to interfere with the exercise of the trial court's
2
discretion in failing to grant the motion for mistrial in this case. "
The court further stated that because it was not clear that plaintiff's
reference to insurance was intentional, this matter remained within the
trial court's discretion because error in failing to grant the mistrial
arises only when the party intentionally brings the fact of the opposing
party's insurance before the jury.'
In Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Georgia, Inc. v. Bennett,2" Bennett
filed suit to recover bad faith penalties and attorney fees under O.C.G.A.
section 33-4-6 because of Blue Cross's failure to pay a covered loss within
sixty days after she demanded payment of benefits under the Blue Cross
policy. Bennett incurred medical expenses at St. Joseph's Hospital while
she was covered by a health insurance plan administered by Blue Cross.
However, she executed an assignment of benefits to St. Joseph's prior to
incurring the medical expenses. As a result of the expenses incurred in
August 1992, and thereafter during the period of September 1992
through March 1994, Bennett made demands for payment from Blue
Cross, but Blue Cross refused those demands. In October 1994, Bennett
filed this suit seeking payment of the benefits plus a bad faith penalty
under O.C.G.A. section 33-4-6.2s7 Four days before the suit was filed,
281. Id. at 99-100, 473 S.E.2d at 180.
282. Id, at 100, 473 S.E.2d at 180.
283. Id
284. Id., 473 S.E.2d at 181.
285. Id. at 101, 473 S.E.2d at 181.
286. 223 Ga. App. 291, 477 S.E.2d 442 (1996).
287. Id at 291, 477 S.E.2d at 443 (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6 (1992)). O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6
provides:
In the event of a loss which is covered by a policy of insurance and the refusal of
the insurer to pay the same within [sixty] days after a demand has been made by
the holder of the policy and a finding has been made that such refusal was in bad
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St. Joseph's reassigned to Bennett the right to receive the benefits under
the Blue Cross policy. While suit was pending, Blue Cross tendered
payment of the benefits at issue.'
The court held that the assignment of benefits to St. Joseph's divested
Bennett of the right to bring an action against Blue Cross under the
insurance policy relying on the 1994 decision of the Georgia Supreme
Court in Allianz Life Insurance Co. v. Riedl.5 9 The court then extended the decision in Riedl to include "all ancillary remedies and rights of
action which Bennett had or would have had as incidents to the cause
of action for the benefits" and to include the claim for bad faith penalties
and attorney fees under O.C.G.A. section 33-4-6.' The court strained
at an interpretation of this code section that allowed St. Joseph's to "in
effect" become the holder of the policy for all purposes relating to
enforcement of the right to the assigned benefits including the right to
demand payment in accordance with the statute. Therefore, because
Bennett did not have any right to demand payment until four days
before filing suit, the earlier demands by Bennett were ineffective
because they were not made at least sixty days before filing suit, and her
earlier demands were not proper. Therefore, Blue Cross was allowed to
escape 29
the
statutory penalties and attorney fees provisions of the
1
statute.
This opinion is questionable because it is not consistent with the
decisions that relate to the assignment of claims against a defendant's
insurer because of bad faith refusal to defend or pay a judgment
rendered against that defendant/insured. Current case law holds that

faith, the insurer shall be liable to pay such holder, in addition to the loss, not
more than [twenty-five] percent of the liability of the insurer for the loss and all
reasonable attorney's fees for the prosecution of the action against the insurer.
The amount of any reasonable attorney's fees shall be determined by the trial jury
and shall be included in any judgment which is rendered in the action; provided,
however, the attorney's fees shall be fixed on the basis of competent expert
evidence as to the reasonable value of the services based on the time spent and
legal and factual issues involved in accordance with prevailing fees in the locality
where the action is pending; provided, further, the trial court shall have the
discretion, if it finds the jury verdict fixing attorney's fees to be greatly excessive
or inadequate, to review and amend the portion of the verdict fixing attorney's fees
without the necessity of disapproving the entire verdict. The limitations contained
in this Code section in reference to the amount of attorney's fees are not
controlling as to the fees which may be agreed upon by the plaintiff and his
attorney for the services of the attorney in the action against the insurer.
288. Id.
289. Id. (citing 264 Ga. 395, 444 S.E.2d 736 (1994)).
290. Id. at 292, 477 S.E.2d at 443-44.
291. Id. at 292-93, 477 S.E.2d at 444.
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an assignment after judgment is rendered only transfers a right to the
damages caused by the insurer's wrongful failure to defend or pay the
judgment and does not convey to the assignee the claims for statutory
bad faith penalties and attorney fees.2" It will be left to the supreme
court to resolve this inconsistency.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The only trend that can be determined through this year's survey is
that more and more of the litigation coming to the courts is in the form
of declaratory judgment actions, and insurers are increasingly beginning
to rely upon the exclusionary provisions of the policies. On the other
hand, claimants are availing themselves of statutory remedies for bad
faith penalties and attorney fees and bringing these issues to the court
more frequently. The result is a softening of the appellate court's
opinion regarding bad faith penalties and attorney fees. Historically,
these claims have not found much favor with the appellate courts, but
as can be seen in this year's survey, more of these claims are being
upheld than have been in past years."

292. See Owens v. Allstate Ins. Co., 216 Ga. App. 650, 455 S.E.2d 368 (1995).

